Since the Qin and Han dynasties, all major dynasty affairs have always prioritized enshrining the capital. As the saying goes, "Things are in the four directions and must be in the center. If the saints hold the key, the four directions will follow suit."
From the Qin Dynasty to the Northern Song Dynasty, the capital changes of each dynasty were Chang'an - Luoyang - Kaifeng from west to east; from the Southern Song Dynasty to the Ming and Qing Dynasties, this change trajectory became Hangzhou - Nanjing - Beijing, from south to north route. The Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms in the middle can be regarded as the transitional period of the Great Turn.
As the political center of the dynasty continued to move north, the economic center continued to move south. The status of water transportation was getting higher and higher. By the middle and late Ming Dynasty, the administrative organization network centered on water transportation made the Grand Canal the core blood vessel of the empire. Economic activities such as material transportation and the radiation of administrative power extended from this artery eventually formed the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal political and economic belt—the core circle of the two empires of the Ming and Qing Dynasties.
Some scholars in later generations believed that canals before the Tang and Song Dynasties were mainly located in the Central Plains, developed in a multi-branch and leaf shape, connected many regions, and played a major role in balancing and regulating the economy. However, during the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the canals were lengthened and the economic belts were distributed linearly, leaving the central and western parts of the empire outside the core circle, which was not conducive to the unification of the empire - it could also be regarded as a family view.
Baojingshi, the fundamental political and economic model of the feudal empire, completely politicized the canal. In order to maintain smooth water transportation, the central governments of all dynasties have spared no effort to maintain smooth water transportation. The sacrifice of local interests cannot be reconciled with the political correctness of smooth water transportation. contend.
The smooth flow of water transportation comes at the cost of huge waste of manpower, material and financial resources. Transporting one stone of rice from Suzhou to the capital costs two stone of rice. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, an average of 4 million shi meters were transported to the capital every year, and the freight amounted to 8 million shi meters per year. Coupled with the annual dredging of rivers, the establishment of management officials and officers, the construction of watercrafts, the establishment of farmland, etc., the expenses are huge.
The huge waste and expenditure resulted in the formation of a huge political and economic interest group around the canal. It was much better to have a canal in the Yuan Dynasty. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the central government was almost always kidnapped by the canal.
A powerful interest group formed around the bureaucratic group of water transportation and the people who were employed and begged for water transportation. The biggest beneficiary group is of course the canal bureaucrats. They benefit in various ways, the most important of which is to continuously cause floods, build river control projects, and then line their own pockets.
It is said that "River officials are extravagant. They spend a lot of money to be full, and they sleep until they are old. They are also restrained by water transportation, and all those who do it are corrupt." In the Ming Dynasty, since the founding of the ancestors, the records of the emperors of the past dynasties show that canals burst almost every year. Record - regardless of flood or drought.
It works from top to bottom, and provincial officials of all sizes who communicate with Cao Cao benefit from a wide range of "shallow fees, gate crossing fees, Huai crossing fees, garrison fees, reminder fees, and storage fees." Even the humble captain of the cavalry was "turned into ashes with his bright clothes, angry horses, restaurants and singing halls, and millions of dollars spent in gambling".
In addition to these corruptions, because water transportation connects the north and south, officials at all levels often carry private goods for profit. By the middle and late Ming Dynasty, these officials colluded with the evil forces and developed to the point where they hid the criminal population and relied on their power to commit murders - blocking rivers, extorting business people and even killing people for money.
However, although most water transport officials are extremely corrupt, occasionally a breath of fresh air can emerge. Mr. Wang Zongmu is an odd figure in this interest group.
The chief water transport officer in the Ming Dynasty was first a water transport envoy, then a general water transport soldier, and finally became a civilian governor of water transport and admiral of military affairs, including Fengyang, overseeing rivers. Later, everyone thought that this official title was too long, so he was generally called the Governor of Water Transport or the Chief of Water Transport.
This official position is usually preceded by the title of Zuo Du Yu Shi or You Du Yu Shi, a third-grade senior official. According to statistics from later generations, the average length of service for the chief magistrate in the Ming Dynasty was 1.88 years, which was less than two years. During the forty-five years of Emperor Jiajing's reign, he changed forty general canals.
Why? There are too many interests involved in water transportation. The scope of power of the General Water Transport Corps involves the General Water Transport Corps, Water Transport Staff General, local state capitals, river governors, the Metropolitan Procuratorate, and the Six Ministries. As a special governor, he not only cooperates with these departments and officials, but also competes for management rights. Therefore, few generals can achieve long-term results.
Wang Zongmu, courtesy name Xinfu, was born in Linhai, Zhejiang. He was a Jinshi in the 23rd year of Jiajing, and was promoted to chief cauldron from the position of chief envoy of Zuo in Shandong in the 5th year of Longqing.
This man is a typical elite of the Ming Dynasty. He dared to sway with half a bottle of vinegar. When he took office, he reported to Emperor Longqing to restore the sea canal. Zhu Yijun couldn't understand his memorial at all, especially the following contents:
"...the sea to the southeast is where all the waters in the world are connected. It is dim and mountainless, and it seeks refuge. Near the south, the water is warm, and the house of Jiaolong Cave...and the ground is high and rocky, where dragons are..." There are goings and goings but there are no cave houses. Therefore, there is a sea market in Dengzhou, which is made of stone gas and water gas competing with each other and reflecting the stone. The stone gas can reach the water surface, so the stone can be used to remove the water and get closer... It can help the canal I am so poor that my plan is inconvenient."
Zhu Yijun had a question mark on his head. He didn't know what the "Dragon Cave House" and the "Both of Stone, Qi, Water and Gas" were. I can see it clearly in other places, but there is no analysis of benefits and workload, and no mention of the difference between sea-going ships and inland river ships. The general idea is that the sea area from the east of Huai'an to Dengzhou and Laizhou has many islands, which can provide shelter from the wind. The water is also shallow and can be used to transport grain.
Along with the memorial, there are also two books written by this man as attachments. Zhu Yijun flipped through it, and it was just a diagram. The level of contemporary cartography was not high, and Zhu Yijun was not demanding.
It was full of successful cases of maritime transportation from the Yuan Dynasty to the Yongle period. As for how it was done, what the ships were like, and how the management organization worked, I couldn't find any of them after rummaging through them. Zhu Yijun rolled his eyes in anger.
What Zhu Yijun didn't know was that in the Qing Dynasty, Wang Zongmu was evaluated like this: "Zongmu covered up and picked up the things", and he was lucky enough to gain fame. I don’t know what Confucian scholars say about economics on paper. Everything they say is unreasonable, but their actions are ineffective. Watching Zongmu can be a warning for talking about shipping. "
Although Wang Zongmu's advocacy of maritime transportation was unreliable, Zhu Yijun still had to greatly encourage and commend him for his dedication to the country. Wang Zongmu's contribution to water transportation was not only his attempt at sea transportation, but also his real insight into the reform of water transportation - this time he was no longer jealous.
Another major disadvantage of water transportation in the Ming Dynasty was the increased consumption when collecting grain. During the Xuande period, the Ming Dynasty promulgated the rules for additional grain consumption for transporting grain: the additional grain consumption for each stone of taxed grain: eight dou in Huguang, seven dou in Jiangxi and Zhejiang, six dou in southern Zhili, and three dou in Shandong and Henan.
Although there are rules and regulations, can the governments at all levels let the common people pay food off? Therefore, there are other additional taxes, such as "two-pointed rice, rat-consuming rice, moisturizing rice, sifted rice" and other items, as well as tax increases for customs clearance of canal ships and material and silver apportionment for building canal ships - miscellaneous Added up, the additional consumption of one stone of rice is basically one stone of rice, which means that the collection of grain has been doubled.
Such an increase in consumption will of course lead to people's deprivation of livelihood. Later, the imperial court had no choice but to deal with the successive disasters in various provinces that supplied grain. Later, the Ming court carried out reforms in the collection of grain - Zese. That is, instead of collecting rice, they directly collect silver and copper coins. After it is transported to the capital, the money is used to buy rice - the merchants transport the grain. There is no extra cost, only the tax money to pass the customs.
This color-folding method started from 100,000 stones during the Chenghua period and has skyrocketed. By the Jiajing period, the number reached as high as 2.11 million shi, accounting for more than half of the country's grain supply. By the time of Emperor Longqing, it had become a rule, one million dan per year, until Zhu Yijun came to power.
Zese's collection of grain was originally an expedient measure to deal with disasters. It became a regular practice during the reign of Emperor Longqing. In fact, it was inevitable when the commodity economy developed to a certain extent.
In other words, large-scale grain trade has occurred in the grain-producing areas of the south, so that farmers have money to trade. At this time, water transportation has developed, and the situation is difficult. There is a shortage of water ships and the flight of water troops. The original four million The task of collecting and transporting grain in Shicao has been out of reach. The solution to the food ration problem for the people in the capital largely relied on the import of commercial grain.
Wang Zongmu discovered this sensitively through his experience in water transportation. Because the change of color of water transportation touched the fundamental interests of water transportation interest groups, the court has always been opposed. Some people often said that the change of color violated the ancestral system. They quoted Emperor Jiajing's criticism of the then governor of water transportation, "From now on, we will follow the ancestral system and do not change it lightly." "This sentence comes to oppose the color-blind policy.
Wang Zongmu settled the accounts for the court: "What cannot be changed today is that the accumulation of Jingcang is gradually decreasing... Every year, about three hundred stones are brought in, and one million is always put out to collect the surplus. Each stone is discounted at 8 qian, and put in at 5 qian, so as to get 3 qian, one million shi is equivalent to 300,000 gold. In addition, there are more than 3,250 warships reduced in stock, each of which is detained. With two grains per month and a reward of forty taels of silver, I will get another 130,000 taels." If you do this for a few years, the country will make great profits.
What does it mean? Wang Zongmu believes that annual grain production is a fixed number. If it's not at A, it's at B. If there is less food in the capital, the price of food will inevitably be high. Then merchants will transport the food to sell it, and the price of food will be driven down.
The annual discount is based on the number of grain stones, which is equivalent to being already in the court's account. Then, because there is no additional consumption of grain for this million stone, each stone will generate a book income of three coins. Of course, this money can be included in fiscal revenue, so "the country can benefit greatly."
How else could it be said that Wang Zongmu, the commander-in-chief, was regarded as a weird thing? Everything he thinks and does has been poaching the water transportation interest groups - so it is not surprising that he was attacked by a swarm of people in the third year of Wanli.
