Gao pragmatic pondered and didn't answer immediately, but Liu Ping knew that as long as he didn't refuse, there was no need to be too anxious. Liu Ping has known Gao Jingshi for more than 20 years. He knew that judging from Gao Ge's usual style, he must be thinking of a solution at this time.
Liu Ping did not dare to rush, lest he interrupt Gao Ge Lao's train of thought, so he could only wait with bated breath.
Gao Pragmatic is really thinking of a way. Just as Liu Ping knew him well, he also knew Zhu Yijun very well. This emperor was also stubborn in nature. It might be easy to persuade him on undecided matters, but once he had made a decision, it would be more difficult to change it.
Gao Wuchen's current judgment is that Zhu Yijun's greed for sea trade profits is not a temporary move, but should have been for a long time. Therefore, the royal fleet plan he proposes now should also have taken shape, and it is basically difficult to directly veto it.
Why is it so hard to veto? It's not that Gao Pragmatic believes that the Ming Emperor's monarchy is really as supreme and unvetoable as some later generations thought, but whether he wants to use "subordinate power" to override the monarchy now.
Later generations often say that the monarchy and dictatorship of the Ming Dynasty was the greatest in history. If we want to talk about this issue, we have to talk about the importance of the imperial power of the Ming Dynasty compared with previous dynasties. To compare the importance of royal power with the past, we have to discuss the relationship between imperial power and various political forces.
In the Ming Dynasty, due to Taizu's purge of meritorious officials and the prevention of foreign relatives, the political power of the Ming Dynasty was nothing more than three: imperial power, eunuch power, and ministerial power. Except for the early Ming and Southern Ming Dynasties, ministerial power almost refers to the civil servant group. right.
Compared with the Han and Tang Dynasties, eunuch power in the Ming Dynasty was always only the product of the extension of imperial power. What is extension? That is to say, the eunuch's power only comes from the monarch, and changes with the replacement of the monarch, his likes and dislikes, and is not affected by the monarch's mediocrity and weakness. And the reason why he gained power was because the monarch wanted to check and balance the civil servant class and was looking for an agent. Therefore, once the monarch changes, the eunuch power that depends on the imperial power will also fall apart.
If Tianqi died, Wei Zhongxian and his party members who were attached to Tianqi's imperial power would also collapse. Since eunuch power is an extension of imperial power, eunuch power can never affect imperial power. As for the eunuchs deposing and establishing monarchs that occurred in the Han and Tang Dynasties, it was impossible to happen in the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, eunuch power has no influence on the size of imperial power.
In this way, eunuch power and imperial power in the Ming Dynasty were not antagonistic. The former was just an extension of the latter. Therefore, it is not tenable to use the great eunuch power to argue that the imperial power was weak, or to use the weak eunuch power to argue that the imperial power was great.
Among the main political forces in the Ming Dynasty, there were only imperial power, eunuch power and ministerial power. Since eunuch power cannot affect the strength of imperial power, to discuss the size of monarchy in the Ming Dynasty, one can only look at the growth and decline between imperial power and ministerial power.
Since the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, Taizu abolished the system of prime ministerial assistance that had been in place for more than a thousand years. However, the abolition of the prime minister does not mean that the current dynasty has embarked on the path of monarchical dictatorship compared with the previous dynasties. Why? It is nothing more than that the relationship between prime ministerial power and imperial power has never been an oppositional relationship of one ebb and flow and the other ebb and flow.
As Mr. Liu Zijian stated in the book "China Turns Inward", those who use the expansion of the prime minister's power to argue that the monarch's power is weak, or use the shrinkage of the prime minister's power to argue that the monarch's power is strong are all based on one premise: that is, the relationship between imperial power and The total sum of the imperial power of the prime minister is an eternal and unchangeable quantity. Therefore, the prime minister's power and the monarch's power are in an antagonistic relationship, and the theory of using the prime minister's power to divide the imperial power and even check and balance the imperial power arises accordingly.
However, the power of the imperial court is not eternal. The premise of using the power of the prime minister to contain the imperial power is self-defeating. Moreover, the imperial power can often increase the total court power of the prime minister and the imperial power by giving more power to the prime minister, or even personally cultivating the prime minister. When the prime minister leaves office, he can turn the court power possessed by the prime minister into his own power. , improve the imperial power.
In the book "China Turns Inward", there are two examples of Lu Yihao and Qin Hui demonstrating the above point of view.
At the beginning of the Southern Song Dynasty, military power was in the hands of generals who were unwilling to be dispatched by the court, and Gaozong's army only had a few thousand soldiers. Facing such a dilemma, Emperor Gaozong's solution was to give Lu Yihao the power to intervene in the personnel and finance of the generals.
However, the prime ministers of the Song Dynasty were not supposed to have the power to interfere in military, financial, or personnel affairs. Lu Yihao gained greater power than ordinary prime ministers. If the power of the prime minister restrains the power of the monarch, Gaozong's power should have shrunk due to the expansion of Lu Yihao's power. .
But in fact, Gaozong was able to take back the power of generals, strengthen his control over local areas, and strengthen his own monarchy. At the beginning of the establishment of the Southern Song Dynasty, Emperor Gaozong's dilemma of having only a few thousand guards was relieved. Therefore, the so-called theory that the power of the prime minister restrains the power of the monarch is self-defeating. It can even be said that the prime minister is just a means for the monarch to centralize power.
Take Qin Hui again as an example. The Jurchens returned the coffin of Gaozong's father and released his mother and returned it to Henan as a condition for the Song Dynasty to contribute annual coins and recognize themselves as a vassal of the Jin Kingdom. Gaozong himself was happy to accept it.
However, the opposition between the DPRK and China was fierce, and the generals who held military power took charge of the battle, making it difficult to implement Gaozong's peace talks. Gaozong's solution was to make Qin Hui the powerful prime minister, that is, the only prime minister. Qin Hui was then given the authority to be responsible for peace talks, so that other bureaucrats could not interfere.
In addition, Qin Hui recalled the three major generals who were leading the battle to the central court and isolated them from the army. In addition to putting the army back under the control of the court, it also erased the influence of the voice of the main battle.
All these enabled Emperor Gaozong to implement his wish for peace talks and resolved the issue of the weight of generals that Emperor Emperor Suye was worried about, thus consolidating the power of the imperial court. After Qin Hui's death, these increased powers were transferred to Gaozong.
Gaozong even used the attack on the Qin family as a means to "eliminate Qin Hui's evil influence" and improve his image and status. However, what Qin Hui did was actually Gaozong's wish.
It can be seen from this that the so-called prime minister is nothing more than an agent in the process of centralization of imperial power and a scapegoat after the consolidation of monarchy.
Furthermore, the power of the prime minister still needs the support of the imperial power. Although it cannot be said that the power of the prime minister is the same as the power of the eunuch, and they are both extensions and vassals of the imperial power, they still need the support of the monarch's power. Therefore, the so-called power of the prime minister restricts the imperial power is really difficult to establish. .
For example: In 1134, Emperor Gaozong was confused and asked Zhang Jun bluntly: "When I discuss issues with the prime ministers, as long as they have slightly different opinions, they will ask to resign so easily. Why is this?"
Zhang Jun replied: "As long as your Majesty reveals a little bit about the differences between you and the prime ministers, commentators will smell which side you agree with, so they will write articles to support it and attack those prime ministers who have different opinions." Under the attack of everyone, the prime minister had no other choice but to ask for resignation."
It can be seen that if the power of the prime minister is not supported by the monarch's power, or even if the prime minister's opinions are inconsistent with the monarch's opinions, he can only resign.
To sum up, three general conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between king and phase:
First, the power of the imperial court is not a variable, so the two are not in a conflicting relationship. The theory that the power of the prime minister restricts the power of the monarch is difficult to establish.
Second, the expansion of the prime minister's power can be a means for the monarch to centralize power. The expansion of the prime minister's power cannot restrict the monarch's power. The prime minister can even be said to be an agent and scapegoat that promotes the monarch's centralization of power.
Third, the power of the prime minister needs the support of the monarch's power, so the theory that the power of the prime minister checks and balances the monarch's power is nonsense. Therefore, it is not advisable to judge that the monarchy in the Ming Dynasty for more than 270 years has expanded unprecedentedly based on the fact that Taizu abolished the prime minister.
But at the same time, it must be admitted that after Taizu deposed the prime minister and even during the period of Emperor Chengzu, the imperial power did strengthen. It can even be said that within a period of time, it reached the peak of monarchy power in all dynasties.
However, the reason for this is not that the monarch's power has lost the checks and balances of the prime minister's power, but that the emperor himself paid the price of diligent administration day and night, which is a manifestation of his direct centralization of power without going through the prime minister. This seems to give the monarch unlimited power, but in fact it is extremely dependent on the emperor's ability.
Therefore, when later emperors become lazy and live in deep palaces for a long time, and are unable to be as diligent and wise as Taizu, their control over power will naturally be greatly reduced. This explains why the power of later monarchs, especially those who were lazy in politics such as Wanli in the original history, has never been able to return to the peak of imperial power in the Hongwu and Yongle dynasties.
This leads to the conclusion that deposing the prime minister in one fell swoop will have no significant impact on whether the monarch's power will expand or not. Therefore, the so-called relationship between ministerial power and monarchical power, or even the relationship between ministerial power and monarchy, should be discussed in terms of ministerial power, that is, the relationship between the power of the civil servant group and imperial power, without the element of prime ministerial power.
Let’s start with the decision-making power. Nominally, the emperor of the Ming Dynasty had the highest decision-making power, and the main manifestation was the so-called red criticism. However, the emperor's orders in the Ming Dynasty had to go through six ministers, and the six departments under them had the right to refute. Moreover, the emperor's orders had to be approved by the cabinet, otherwise they would be illegal.
Qian Mu's "New Theory of National History" said: "In the Qing Dynasty, the emperor's important orders were issued directly from the Nanshufang Military Aircraft Department, and could be issued directly to the central and local administrative heads of various agencies. This was impossible in the Ming Dynasty and was illegal. of.
The emperor's orders in the Ming Dynasty must first be issued to six ministers, which are equivalent to the ministers of the various ministries of the Executive Yuan today, but the emperor in the Ming Dynasty seems to have served as the Executive Yuan himself.
In the Ming Dynasty, there were special consultants under each Shangshu. They were called the Six Ministries. They had the right to refute the emperor's orders. As long as they disagreed, they could return the emperor's edicts intact. "
Fang Zhiyuan also said in "The Structure and Operational Mechanism of State Power in the Ming Dynasty": "The drafting of the emperor's edicts and the comments and replies of various ministers, if they are not drafted by the cabinet, are called central edicts, hand edicts, or 'internal edicts'. The batch'... does not comply with normal procedures."
Zhu Yongjia's "The Origin and Gains and Loss of the Political System of the Ming Dynasty" also said: "If the drafting of the emperor's edict is called 'Zhongzhi', 'Hand-Edict', or 'Internal Approval' without cabinet vote, it cannot be counted." The issuance of legal and formal documents...the vote will become a formal and indispensable procedure in the decision-making process."
Commentators often bring up the issue of red approval by eunuchs whenever they see a vote maker, to prove that ministerial power has little influence on decision-making. The eunuch power is an extension of the imperial power, so it is used to discuss the dictatorship of the monarch. However, this theory is not valid, because the so-called eunuchs still need to follow the system when approving red officials, and they are not allowed to act arbitrarily.
Li Bozhong said in "Research on the National Decision-making Mechanism in the Late Ming Dynasty": "Under normal circumstances, whenever a chapter is memorialized, the Chief of Ceremonies must send it to the emperor for reading, and major events must be approved by the emperor himself. The emperor's approval must be written in the chapter memorial, which is called 'Holy Batch'.
The eunuch's approval is different from the saint's approval. First, the approval by the eunuch is for common people; second, it must be approved by the cabinet before approval; third, the eunuchs who are responsible for the ceremony are divided into batches, not exclusive to one person; fourth, the approval must be based on the cabinet vote. Red; fifth, the approval is written next to Zhang Shu and is only used as a reference for the emperor to make decisions.
Among them, the cabinet transfer is the key, so the eunuch's approval is also called "the transfer approval". Without the approval of the cabinet, it was considered illegal for eunuchs to approve red papers without permission, and the six subjects were dismissed. "
It can be seen that the cabinet, that is, part of the ministerial power, plays an important role in the decision-making of the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, from a system or customary perspective, it cannot be said that the ministerial power is always weak, but the monarch's power is always strong.
In addition to the influence of the cabinet in decision-making, in the Ming Dynasty, whenever major military and state affairs were encountered, they followed the tradition of "major matters must be discussed together", so decisions were made through court consultation. This can be seen from the "court discussions on major events" recorded in the "Six Sections" of the Official Records of Ming Dynasty.
The so-called "major events" actually include the following matters: 1. Discussing the establishment of the king; 2. Discussing suburban sacrifices; 3. Discussing ceremonies; 4. Discussing titles; 5. Discussing vassal relations; 6. Discussing ministers; 7. Discussing civil affairs.
The court consultation system was established in the early Ming Dynasty. Whenever major events occurred, the monarch would personally preside over and discuss with the ministers. At this time, the decision-making power was dominated by the monarch, but the power of ministers could also play a certain role in decision-making.
In the Yingzong period (especially the early period), because the emperor lived in the palace for a long time, the imperial court meetings were hosted by ministers, and they became custom-made from then on. Most of the decisions on military and state affairs are based on court discussions.
In "On the Constraints of the Imperial Power by the Imperial Council System in Ancient China", the statistics of court councils are as follows:
"There are a total of 101 court deliberations recorded in Volume 45 of "Ming Hui Yao" "Gathering Meetings" (excluding one-case review and content related to the court deliberations system), 13 of which were vetoed by the monarch or not reported (not implemented by the subordinates) .
Among these 13 items, the most common ones are ancestral temples and ceremonies. There were 14 court discussions on ancestral temple matters, 5 of which were rejected (including 2 unreported ones); there were 11 ceremonies in total, 2 of which were rejected. The number of cases in which the monarch vetoed court deliberations accounted for about 12% of the total number of court deliberations. "
From this point of view, the court meeting did have a great influence on the decision-making of military and state affairs. Overall, this influence is still in the hands of civil servants. Even if the monarch occasionally vetoes matters discussed by the court, it is mainly for matters related to the ancestral temple, in other words, internal affairs of the royal family. In this way, how can we explain that the monarchs of modern times were dictatorial in decision-making?
Now that we have talked about the court council, we should further discuss the system of court council, that is, the "minister council" item in the court council, in order to discuss the monarch's human rights in the Ming Dynasty.
What is tingtui? This is the system of simplifying and selecting important officials in the Ming Dynasty, and the courtiers jointly decided on the candidates for senior officials.
"History of the Ming Dynasty" explains the system of court recommendation in this way: "Cabinet bachelors and official ministers are recommended by the court or by special orders. Those below the rank of minister and those who offer wine are recommended by the officials in conjunction with the third rank and above. Those below Taichang Qing are recommended by the ministry. Tong and Shen will select the following officials at the Hongzhengmen meeting. Zhan affairs are handled by the cabinet, and each yamen is in charge of the seal. For foreign officials, the governor and Fu Tingtui are all nine ministers, and they are in charge of the official department. There are vacancies for cloth and press officials, and those of third rank or above Officials will be promoted."
However, whenever this point is discussed, there will always be those who insist on the so-called monarchical dictatorship of the Ming Dynasty, claiming that the final decision-making power of Tingtui is still in the hands of the emperor, so Tingtui is only a reference for the emperor, a tool of the emperor's rule, and is used by the monarch. There is no infringement on human rights.
However, if we carefully study the role of the monarch in the court process, even if the nominal decision-making power is still in the hands of the monarch, if we look at the actual operation, we will find that the emperor will still follow the results of the court process.
Volume 101 of "Records of King Sejong" records: "Since the imperial edict was promoted to ministers, only those who agreed with each other can be heard. If the interview is distorted for a while, the Taoist officials of Xu Ke will correct the edict."
Sometimes the emperor does not follow the results of the main recommendation - that is, the candidate listed first in the list according to the talent, qualifications, reputation, etc. of the official department - but chooses the accompanying recommendation, that is, the candidate listed later in the list. Often They will also be condemned by the officials, and the person involved will refuse and refuse to accept the official position to avoid becoming a public target.
"History of the Ming Dynasty" Volume 233 "Biography of Wang Zongmu with Wang Shixing" records: "Henan lacks a governor, and the court recommends the kingdom as the first, followed by (the king's) scholarly nature, and the emperor specially uses scholarly nature. The scholarly nature is sparse in speech, and his words are not as good as the country's. .”
This kind of thing is not unique in the Ming Dynasty.
As Liu Yulong said in "An Exploration of the Court Recommendation System for Civilian Ministers in the Ming Dynasty": "(Ting Recommendation) is after the Ministry of Personnel has initially prepared ministerial candidates, and then the court ministers will discuss them at a meeting, and jointly recommend candidates who are popular, have both political integrity and talent. The officers are selected by the ministers for the emperor to choose.
This was objectively a constraint on the unprecedented expansion of imperial power at that time. Whenever the emperor appointed ministers in violation of the regulations, scholar-bureaucrats who took it as their duty to maintain the feudal dynasty's code would often come forward to resist by making impassioned speeches.
At the beginning of the Jiajing period, Emperor Shizong appointed Xi Shu, the minister of the Ministry of War in Nanjing, as the Minister of Rites by special decree. The court officials lured him by handing over Xi Shu, saying that Xi Shu was not allowed to be used by the imperial court, forcing him to resign repeatedly.
On the eve of the 19th year of Wanli, Zhao Zhigao and Zhang Wei entered the cabinet with a special order. Lu Guangzu, the official secretary, wrote a letter, saying that special bamboo slips were not made by the government, but the court promoted "widespread loyalty to gather the people, and Du partiality listened to the traitors, and eliminated the troubles of Ah Si". '. Because there were so many opponents and the protests were fierce, Shenzong was forced to say that he would not set an example. "
Interestingly, it was this function of dividing imperial power that made the Qing rulers of the Qing Dynasty angrily comment: "Jian Guan came from the court, and it was actually the government of the Ming Dynasty." "Employing people is to control the great power, why should Tai'a be left alone!" .
In this way, the so-called court recommendation is only a reference for the emperor to employ people and does not affect the monarch's dictatorship, which is self-defeating. The influence of ministerial authority in national decision-making is also obvious.
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ps: If you read this book and see today, you must have discovered that from my writing style, once I start writing "theory", it will inevitably mean that the direction of the plot will change. This chapter and the next chapter will be the theoretical foreshadowing before subtle changes occur in the relationship between Gao Pragmatic and Zhu Yijun. Some of the issues mentioned in these two chapters are also the subsequent tests of high pragmatism and governance capabilities. You can wait and see.
