Since Song Liangzuo's two letters this time were not formal documents sent to the court, he could skip the routine and use the "Southwest Pigeon Passage" from Chengdu to the capital to convey the message. The advantage of homing pigeons is not only their fast flight speed, but also the fact that they basically do not need to take detours, which can greatly reduce the contact distance.
It's certainly a long way to go from Chengdu to the capital, but in fact the straight-line distance between them is just over three thousand miles. The average flying speed of the homing pigeons trained by Jinghua is about two hundred miles in half an hour (one hour). However, pigeons are not perpetual motion machines after all, and cannot fly all at once. They have to stop and change pigeons in the middle to engage in a "relay race." But even so, the news was delivered to the capital the next day.
Jinghua’s pigeon system has not been established for a long time. For example, in the entire southwest of the Ming Dynasty, there is only one “nationally radiating” pigeon station in Chengdu. However, the area around the capital is relatively dense. For example, last year's rescue battle showed that there was one in Daning.
As a result, Zhou Yong received Song Liangzuo's message at noon the next day, and Gao Pragmatic also received the news in the afternoon. The news Gao pragmatic received was not only the letter sent by Song Liangzuo, but also one sent by Zhou Yong - he wrote to Gao pragmatic after convening relevant officials of the Practical School, especially officials from the Ministry of War, for urgent discussion.
The reason why everyone hurriedly informed Gao Jingshi was not to urge him to quickly finish the battle against Meng Yuan before going to Bozhou, but because the southwest response was too failed and they had to hire him, the "best literary commander in the world." Give some guidance.
To be honest, Southwest fought two battles, and both battles were really crotch-stretching. In World War I, Guizhou sent troops and suffered a loss of three to four thousand; in World War II, Sichuan sent troops and lost another seven to eight thousand. The total of these was a direct reimbursement of 10,000 troops.
Isn't this a joke? Gao Jingshi fought the entire Battle of Monan without losing so many Ming troops, but now they have lost 10,000 soldiers just to fight the chieftain! This situation is already ugly. It's almost the same as during Japan's communist era when it couldn't defeat the enemy and had to ask for "tactical guidance" from superiors.
Gao Pingshi was furious after reading the two letters. Good guy, I specially transferred Liu Wei to you to take charge, but you just ignored him because of some epidemics caused by the acclimatization of Liu Wei's troops. Do you have to rush to kill a wave of people?
On the other hand, the two "defeated generals" Wang Zhihan and Guo Cheng who led the troops on the front line actually performed well. Guo Cheng died heroically in battle. There is nothing to say. Although Gao Pragmatic looked at it, he found that his performance was not a major mistake.
He was prepared for the enemy's false surrender. Even if Mu Zhao resorted to such a cruel trick, the Ming army only sent troops forward after joining forces, and in fact they only moved about thirty miles. If there was any mistake, it should be a misjudgment of the strength of the Bozhou Army. Judging from its marching performance, he seemed to believe that the Ming Army would be sure to win after the combined forces.
Wang Zhihan's Pingyue Guards were the main force of the Ming army in the east of Guiyang, and Guo Cheng's troops had gone north to fight in the past two years. Both armies were considered powerful armies in the south. It is understandable that he had strong self-confidence.
The misjudgment was most likely due to the strength of the Bozhou Army. The Bozhou Army is similar to other chieftains. When they send troops with the imperial court, they can usually send two or three thousand troops, which is considered "favorable". However, the military force maintained in the territory for a long time may not exceed two or three thousand troops.
In this case, Wang Zhihan most likely regarded the total strength of the Bozhou Army as twenty to thirty thousand, deducting some troops that could not be mobilized. He probably believed that the Bozhou Army could only mobilize more than ten thousand troops, and it would not be able to survive more than two people. Wan, this is troublesome.
Gao Pragmatic, who is very familiar with chieftains, knows very well that for these chieftains in the mountains, almost all the adult male natives under his command can be pulled over at any time to become native soldiers, and these native soldiers use bamboo spears and the like in the mountainous areas. The combat effectiveness of weapons in combat seems to be innate. As long as they are trained in basic military regulations, they can be used in combat.
Yang Yinglong had been doing this for some time, so why didn't he make preparations in advance and drill the local people under his command first? Huang Zhiting had said back then that her family usually maintained at most two to thirty thousand wolf soldiers, but if they really had to go all out, it would not be surprising at all to pull out an army of eighty thousand.
Gao Pragmatic also asked Huang Zhiting back then, how the power of the major Guangxi chieftain families compares to the Bozhou Chieftain? Huang Zhiting's answer is that in terms of military strength, the Yang family in Bozhou is slightly better than the Cen family and even better than the Huang family. Moreover, the Yang family in Bozhou is close to the hinterland of the Miao territory where the "Three No Matters" rule has been established, and has always had a good relationship with the Miao people. If a war breaks out, the Yang family is likely to get help from the Miao people.
The second half of Huang Zhiting's answer was added by herself because she felt that Gao Pragmatic might want to return to Banzhou when he asked this question, so she had to tell him the worst possibility first.
In other words, judging from her judgment, Banshu could recruit more than 100,000 native soldiers in wartime relying only on its own strength, and the remaining Miao support would be difficult to estimate accurately.
Gao Pragmatic believed her judgment, because in his previous life, when he read the historical materials of the Three Great Wars, he saw that Yang Yinglong had as many as 160,000 troops when the war was at its strongest. It was precisely because Yang Yinglong's trouble was so serious and occurred in the hinterland of the country that Ming Dynasty had no choice but to make a completely winnable war to aid Korea a little bit anticlimactic - there was no doubt that he would win, but he always felt that it was almost meaningless.
Now Yang Yinglong's rebellion seems to have broken out ahead of schedule, which obviously disrupted Gao Pragmatic's plan and encountered almost the worst one in the "Southwest Plan" he had prepared. However, since there is a plan, things can still be dealt with.
Gao pragmatically took up the post of Mongolian Economic Strategy without resigning as Minister of Household Affairs. This was just like the previous time when he went to Ningxia without resigning as Minister of Rongzheng. It was quite special for the imperial court, but it also brought some tangible benefits. For example, this time, he could state in his reply that some official warehouses in the southwest under the Ministry of Revenue can be opened to supply military pay, food, ordnance and other materials. In fact, this is also a very important point in the purpose of Zhou Yong's letter, but it is not necessary. Just wear it.
In addition to financial and material support, Zhou Yong must also have highly pragmatic opinions on how to use troops in the southwest. The reasons are nothing more than two points: First, Gao Pragmatic's reputation, status and ability in the school of pragmatism are greater than Zhou Yong's. If Gao Pragmatic does not agree, no one knows how much power the Southwest can use; second, Gao Pragmatic's Bian Gong was born in the southwest, and he obviously had arrangements in the southwest for a long time. However, Zhou Yong was promoted from governor of Liaodong and governor of Jiliao to Grand Sima. He had almost a dark eye on the situation in the southwest. Regardless of Gao Pragmatism, he almost could only Make random arrangements according to the Ministry of War's brochure, and then make blind efforts.
So, does Gao Pragmatic have any clever strategies that can easily defeat Bozhou? No.
If you think that as long as the Bozhou Rebellion is suppressed, you may also consider using your fame to trick Yang Yinglong into "transferring the tiger away from the mountain". Although the probability is difficult to guarantee, you can still give it a try.
But the problem is that the Bozhou Rebellion has reached this point, and it is actually directly linked to the success or failure of Guizhou's return to its native land, which means that unless there is a way to wipe out the Yang family, it is meaningless to kill just one Yang Yinglong. His son is still there, and even if he doesn't, he still has a bunch of nephews and other relatives. The Yang family can't just sit back and watch the Bozhou Chieftain disappear, and they will definitely resist to the end.
Political means fail, economic means... People's economy is basically self-sufficient, and they can't pay for it if they are too pragmatic. They cut off their own heads, so the only thing left is to conquer by force.
The Yang family in Bozhou can muster an army of 160,000, which is a highly pragmatic "difficulty estimate". Although it may not be reached yet, but the enemy is expected to be lenient, it must be calculated according to this number to be safe. The Bozhou Army is an internal defense, and its demand for troops is smaller than that of the attacking side, so the imperial court may send more than 200,000 troops.
It is very difficult for the Ming army to dispatch more than 200,000 troops in the south. Even if they reluctantly do so, most of them will probably be guardsmen who only know how to farm and do miscellaneous tasks. Therefore, these troops are ineffective. If they really have to send 200,000 troops, When the main force of Jiubian cannot go south to support, we mainly have to find a way from the chieftains.
The southern chieftains of the Ming Dynasty have always performed well in wars. Whether it is the child wolf soldiers, Miao soldiers, Yao soldiers, Tujia soldiers and other local soldiers, they are all troops that the Ming court often requires to accompany the conscripts. This situation is of course It can also be copied during the Conquest of Bozhou.
So Gao pragmatically found the Beijing version of the Ming Dynasty map, and began to consider recruiting chieftains from the provinces around Bozhou. It doesn't matter if you don't look at it, but you will be shocked when you see it. There are more than one toast around Banshu.
To the north of Bozhou is Chongqing, and to the east of Chongqing are Shili Xuanwei Division and Youyang Xuanfu Division (the Xuanwei Division is larger than the Xuanfu Division in terms of level). Looking further east, they are located in the southwest of Huguang, which is also the "Puanyuan Governor" The territory under his jurisdiction was the Xiangxi region in later generations. This area is even more powerful, with two Xuanwei Divisions, three Xuanfu Divisions, one Tuzhou, and one Changgui Division.
Guizhou itself is also amazing. Everyone knows the name of Shuixi Tusi. The Tian family who "thinks about planting Yang in Tian, and Cenhuang in Guangdong and Guangxi" is here. Although the Sizhou and Sinan Tian families have been severely divided by the imperial court over the years, there are still a large number of chieftains from various places who have been favored by the Tian family and are similar to "tweening favors". These powers can now be mobilized by the imperial court.
None of the so-called "four heavenly kings" of Guizhou chieftains, An, Song, Tian, and Yang, are easy to mess with. But now that the Yang family has rebelled, the other three families are obviously facing different difficulties in making choices - not that they dare to oppose the imperial recruitment. , but the degree of effort may vary from person to person.
Some families have a good relationship with the Yang family, and they will inevitably try to work hard without contributing; some families have a normal relationship with the Yang family, and they may also work hard because they are sad for the death of rabbits and foxes; and some families may have problems with the Yang family. Conflict will be easier to exploit, but considering that they may also want to preserve their strength as much as possible, they may not necessarily go all out, but it is better than the first two.
But no matter what, Guizhou now has dozens of long-term lawsuits, large and small. Even if each of them only sends a hundred troops, there are tens of thousands of troops. Not to mention there are some Tufu, it is impossible to use the "hundred people" A difference in scale.
To the west of Bozhou is Sichuan. The chieftains in northwest Sichuan have border defense tasks and cannot be easily moved, but the chieftains in southern Sichuan can obviously be mobilized at any time. What is the situation with Sichuan South Toast? The answer is that the four major military and civilian offices of Zhenxiong, Wumeng, Wusa, and Dongchuan plus the Yongning Xuanfu Division can also mobilize tens of thousands of troops at any time.
If this is not enough, the two Tusi clusters in Guangxi and Yunnan can also serve as backup. Although the most powerful Cen and Huang families and some of their affiliated forces were removed from the Guangxi chieftains by Gao Pangshi, the big chieftains such as Zhao and Li and their affiliated forces are still among them, and these forces can obviously be mobilized.
Moreover, in recent years in Guangxi, due to the development and purchase of timber, tung oil, etc. from Jinghua, the economic strength of the chieftains has also increased. It has become easier to bring their own soldiers and rations with them during the expedition. They even dare not refuse the court, and they are even less likely to refuse. Dare to work but don’t work hard. Gao Pragmatic estimates that if it is really necessary, it is not impossible to mobilize tens of thousands more wolf soldiers from Guangxi.
As for Yunnan, let alone that. For example, when Liu Wei was in charge of guarding southern Yunnan and northern Myanmar, he had less than 30,000 soldiers, but he was nominally in charge of 100,000 chieftain soldiers in his jurisdiction.
So Gao pragmatically drew up the composition of the troops for the attack on Bozhou based on the proportion of 30% of the Ming army and 70% of the native soldiers. This time, the entire army mobilized 240,000 troops. The Ming Army's "Jingzhi Army" was about 70,000, and the various chieftains' troops were about 170,000. They were still divided into several groups to advance for encirclement and suppression. This is not because they don't want to concentrate their forces, but it is inconvenient in mountainous areas. Not to mention that there is no major road in the mountain, and it is basically impossible to walk on it. The logistical pressure is so great that the army may starve to death on the road.
Of course, Gao Pragmatic was also worried about being defeated by Yang Yinglong's inside maneuvers, so his plan was very similar to Chang Kaishen's third siege at a certain period, using the tactics of "gathering troops thickly, attacking in separate ways, and advancing straight in".
To put it simply, the other roads are not weak in gathering troops, but they do not advance easily. They occupy one place and consolidate it, advance layer by layer, and gradually narrow the encirclement; while the one with Liu Wei's troops as the core is the main attack, directly from the north road. Inserted to the south, like a high-hanging sword piercing down into the heart of Bozhou, this also forced Yang Yinglong's main force to come to the decisive battle, intending to rely on Liu Wei's troops to defeat the core force of Bozhou Army head-on.
There is no doubt that the core of this operation still revolves around Liu Wei's troops. This is also the purpose of Gao Pragmatic's transfer of Liu Wei to Sichuan. However, operational planning is easy to handle, but political troubles are not so easy to handle. For example, Song Liangzuo's wave of battles cost seven or eight thousand people, which will definitely cause an uproar after the court learns of the news, and the practical school will face huge pressure.
The Practical School is different from the Heart School. It does not rely on words but actual results. If you are defeated, you are defeated. There is actually little meaning in asking for mercy. However, Song Liangzuo still had to protect his position, even if it was not based on political considerations, but also on military considerations. If an official from the non-practical school was replaced as the governor of Sichuan at this time, would the encirclement and suppression strategy set by Gao Wushi be effectively implemented? There will also be doubts.
Failure has already occurred, how to protect it?
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