Two cavalrymen, a combined force of nearly 100,000 troops, actually engaged in mobile warfare. What kind of situation would this be?
This is probably something that many people of later generations would find difficult to imagine, and it may be difficult for them to understand why two cavalrymen from the same race would fight like this.
According to common sense, everyone is a Mongolian cavalry, no one has to be inferior in equestrian skills, their movement speed should be about the same, and their riding and shooting skills should be about the same.
In this case, it is almost meaningless to continue to use the tactics of approaching, shooting and harassing, and the same is true of Mangu's evil tactics. Does the other party still know what you want to do? If you want to retreat, I will hold you up leisurely. If you want to cum, I will cum with you.
Therefore, conventional Mongolian cavalry tactics have no effect in the Mongolian cavalry civil war. The only way to win is when both sides give up those tricks and directly charge into battle.
But is it really that simple? Of course it's not that simple.
Because one of the most critical differences lies in the logistics status of both parties.
The Mongolian cavalry has always been famous for its so-called "expedition without logistics" capability, but this capability was only occasionally mentioned in later literature. Most people's focus is still on the Mongolian Manguji, who dominates the world, even if it is mentioned. Not much is said about logistics, as if the Mongols only needed to drink mare's milk during their 100,000-mile expedition.
This is a kind of taken for granted without verification.
Even if an ordinary person in future generations is given only mare's milk for a month, he can only maintain his life. How can he maintain high-intensity marching or even fighting?
Mongolians are humans too, so naturally they cannot live by drinking mare's milk alone. Besides, are all horses mare and in the lactation stage?
Mares are of course an important source of food, but the Mongols actually also have logistics. The traditional Mongolian diet of fried rice, milk tofu, and beef jerky are all foods that are easy to preserve after dehydration and can be stored for up to several months.
These foods can be eaten after simple processing. For example, fried rice is a rice grain obtained by frying millet rice and grinding the outer shell. It can be eaten dry or soaked in hot water.
Milk tofu is a food made from solidified and fermented milk, goat's milk, mare's milk, etc. It is similar in shape to ordinary tofu and can be eaten dry or steamed.
Needless to say, beef jerky can be eaten directly, and milk, goat milk, milk tea, etc. are all foods that are easy to obtain and can be eaten without spending too much cooking time.
However, it was two hundred years ago to travel thousands of miles with only this food. In fact, it is difficult for the Mongols to do this now. Therefore, when Tumen Khan went on an expedition, he also brought a group of cattle and sheep.
Cattle and sheep can be used for both milk and meat. They are the basic guarantee for the Mongols when they go on an expedition. The Chahar tribe will naturally bring a lot of cattle and sheep as a supplement when the main force is sent out this time.
When the 60,000-strong army went into battle, Tumen Khan brought more than 3,000 cattle and more than 70,000 sheep.
This number is quite large when viewed alone, but in reality, 60,000 people are not much, and in addition to the more than 10,000 Xin'ai troops who have lost their foundation, this logistics is actually somewhat insufficient.
Tumen Khan's idea at that time was that this batch of cattle and sheep would only last until he and Xin Ai reunited, because the rest could be solved by Xin Ai. If Xin Ai could not completely solve the problem, then he could take down Hanna. Jihe Guihua City can also be properly solved.
But something went wrong. Xin Ai lost all his people, and of course all his cattle and sheep. Even his subordinates could no longer make the two horses that the Mongolian cavalry used to do. Many of them only had one horse.
Tumen Khan not only failed to leave the logistical burden to Xin Ai, but Xin Ai himself became Tumen's support. At this time, Tumen Khan's task of 3,000 cattle and 70,000 sheep became even heavier. .
Previously, Tumen and Burihatu had discussed that they would launch an offensive in Shacheng for ten days, but the first wave of trials was launched in only six or seven days. One of the reasons was that the logistics were tight, forcing Tumen Khan to advance the offensive. A fight, hoping to capture Shacheng as a supplement. Since Shacheng is guarded by the Ming army, according to the habits of the Ming army, there must be a large amount of supplies in the city, including stored grain.
I just didn't expect that the Ming army's defensive capabilities were too strong, and the artillery fire was too fierce.
Tumen Khan, who was frustrated in his attack on Shacheng, was faced with the danger of a pincer attack from the east and west. Under Burihatu's suggestion, he chose the strategy of defeating the Eastern Route Army first. In this case, of course, these cattle and sheep had to be taken with him to avoid being left behind. At the foot of Shacheng City, Han Naji, who came from the west, finally got an advantage.
However, the moving speed of cattle and sheep was obviously not as fast as that of war horses, so Tumen Khan had to divide his troops, forming a situation in which the main force of about 55,000 cavalry was in the front, and the 5,000 cavalry escorted and protected the cattle and sheep in the rear.
On the other hand, Qiataiji is different. To the south is the Ming Dynasty, and with the highly pragmatic Jinghua as guarantee, he can safely leave the cattle and sheep at the various horse market branches of Jinghua Trading Company at the border because they have to trade horses, cattle and sheep. Trade, Jinghua has large horse farms in these places, and herding some cattle and sheep is not a problem at all.
Why did Gao Pragmatic choose the southern front as the battlefield? Better logistical support capabilities are also an important reason.
Under such a situation, with Qataiji's rich combat experience, how could he fail to see Tumen Khan's disadvantages?
Using one's own strengths to attack the other's weaknesses is the unified law of the world's military affairs. Therefore, Qataiji did not choose to rush into battle with Tumen Khan, whose strength was nearly twice his own, but chose to let him I personally went out and led a small number of elites to hold back Tumen Khan. At the same time, I sent Qingbangdu, Daerhan Ruobulang and others to lead the 15,000-strong guard of the Great Khan from the flanks to the rear of Tumen Khan. The target was Tumen Khan. The cattle and sheep brought by their sweat.
Tumen is not an idiot. The opponent's troops obviously do not have 30,000 troops, but the Chinese army has displayed the banner of Chatterji. This almost makes it clear that the opponent still has the main force performing other tasks.
There are only two possibilities for other missions. One is to plan to suddenly rush out from the flank when he and Chaterji are fighting inextricably, trying to defeat him directly. But he felt that the other party was not so confident that half of his troops wanted to play this trick with him. After all, the main reason why he was unable to defeat Qataiji in front of him for the moment was because the terrain was inconvenient to expand.
As mentioned before, the terrain here is the intersection line of mountains and grasslands, and Qataiji's attack was launched along the intersection line, which meant that Tumen Khan's front was only half as wide as usual. Although he could choose to go around and expand on the left, it might also force Chatterjee into the mountains to the south.
"Don't enter the forest" is one of the cavalry's marching rules, but if Qia Taiji chose to enter the mountain to avoid the sharp edge of the Tumen, there would be no problem at all. On the contrary, after he entered the mountain, the Tumen did not dare to chase him into the mountain. The cavalry must be inconvenient to operate, and it will be difficult to take advantage of the large number of troops.
Of course we are not willing to fight this kind of bad war.
Since they are unwilling to outflank from the left, they can only fight Chaterji with half the width of the frontal battlefield. On such a battlefield that is not conducive to the deployment of troops, although Tumen can take the initiative by relying on their strength advantage, It seems that Chatterji is being beaten, but it is understandable that he will not be able to take it down for a while.
At this time, Tumen had to consider the whereabouts of the other 15,000 cavalry. Since these people were unlikely to attack his main formation from the flanks, they could only attack the cattle and sheep in the rear. .
Although not too worried, Tumen had no choice but to divide his troops to rescue the "logistics troops" in the rear.
He thought for a while, and simply sent Xin Ai over. Xin Ai had more than 10,000 men and horses. In addition, there were already 5,000 cavalry in the rear to escort cattle and sheep. This force already exceeded the surrounding troops sent by Qataiji. Tumen felt that Not a big problem.
Thanks to book friend "Gangbar 913" for your monthly ticket support, thank you! The previous chapter should have been "The Decisive Battle of Shacheng 16", but it was omitted when I posted it.
