On February 1st, Yeluma crossed the river to build the city;
On February 2, Li Shouzhen, the commander-in-chief of the cavalry of the Forbidden Army of the Later Jin Dynasty, Huangfu Yu, the general of the Forbidden Army, Liang Hanzhang, the defense envoy of Chenzhou, and Xue Huairang, the governor of Huaizhou, led 10,000 people to march along the Yellow River waterway to support eastward.
On February 3, Shi Gongba, a pioneer officer of the Later Jin Dynasty who was on the main battlefield between Chanzhou and Weizhou, was ordered to patrol and investigate between Chanzhou and Weizhou. He encountered the Khitan army and was trapped in Qicheng (between Chanzhou and Weizhou). On the Chanzhou side). Coach Gao Xingzhou and deputy coach Fu Yanqing were resting in the forest. After receiving the news, they hurriedly marched forward and rushed to the rescue.
Gao Xingzhou and Fu Yanqing preconceivedly thought that the Khitan was just a group of reconnaissance cavalry, after all, they were under Chanzhou's nose. But they never expected that the Khitan would dispatch a large army, and their strategic intentions were not yet known.
"The Khitan crowd was very strong and they were heavily surrounded." All three were trapped in a tight siege, so they hurriedly sent people to the rear to find Jing Yanguang and ask for more reinforcements.
Jing Yanguang, however, played with bureaucracy and said that he must consult Shi Chonggui for all actions and "wait for the emperor to proceed".
According to records, the Khitan troops numbered tens of thousands at that time. Perhaps their target was the Chanzhou base camp, and Comrade Shi Gongba successfully blocked the gun.
With no reinforcements yet, Gao Xingzhou and others discussed and decided to risk a breakout.
Thousands of Central Plains soldiers were surrounded by tens of thousands of Khitan soldiers. From Gao Xingzhou down, everyone was determined to die. Either way, it's death. Rather than sit back and wait for death, it's better to give it a try.
Fu Yanqing led hundreds of elites to charge and opened a gap in the encirclement. Gao Xingzhou yelled with anger and fought hard. His 20-year-old son Gao Huaide fired his bow from left to right, and shot from left to right, chopping melons and vegetables, protecting his father all the way. After a bloody battle, Gao Xingzhou and others finally miraculously broke through the encirclement, but the troops suffered heavy casualties.
Gao Huaide later married a widow named Zhao, who had a brother named Zhao Kuangyin.
At this time, Shi Chonggui personally led the army to come to support, and the Khitan soldiers retreated. Gao Xingzhou and others were finally out of danger.
Knowing that there were tens of thousands of Khitan tigers and wolves in front of him, Shi Chonggui still went into battle personally and led his men to fight tooth and nail. Shi Chonggui's courage was definitely better than that of Shi Jingtang and Li Congke.
Gao Xingzhou and others, who had walked around the gate of hell, couldn't help but burst into tears after seeing the reinforcements, "I almost never see them again!"
Shi Chonggui personally bought wine to calm the generals who narrowly escaped death.
Gao Xingzhou, Fu Yanqing, and Shi Gongba "wept relative to each other" and immediately impeached Jing Yanguang for refusing to save him.
In fact, Jing Yanguang also has his own difficulties. There are two main reasons why he "does not save him":
First, although Jing Yanguang has been a soldier all his life, he has never had experience in large-scale military operations, let alone command experience. He cannot take charge of it alone. Based on his own ability shortcomings, he cannot adapt to changes during deployment and command, but can only mechanize the execution of the prepared combat plan.
According to the original plan, troops dispersed and stationed at several important crossings were not allowed to rescue each other, because the Khitan cavalry was highly mobile. If they were tricked into attacking from the east or west, or diverting the tiger away from the mountain, there would be a risk of the entire line collapsing. If the Khitan opens a gap at a certain point, subsequent supporting troops will naturally compete to refill the hole in the defense line, preventing the entire line from collapsing.
Secondly, Jing Yanguang's position is rather awkward. Let's say he is in charge. There is Emperor Shi Chonggui behind him. Let's say he is not in charge. Everything must be reported to him first.
If the first reason is a military consideration, then the second reason is entirely a political pain point. Jing Yanguang did not dare to be "good at specializing" and did not dare to bypass Shi Chonggui. Otherwise, all the credit would be due to Shi Chonggui's leadership, and all the fault would be his arbitrary power. If not, he might be accused of being arrogant and domineering, and could easily lose his life. Therefore, Jing Yanguang always consults Shi Chonggui on all matters, no matter how big or small.
In addition, in this battle in Qicheng, a senior Khitan general was killed. According to historical records, a group of Khitan troops retreating to the north was captured by the defenders of Jizhou. They were surprised to find that this was a funeral procession escorting a coffin. After interrogation, it was learned that the person lying in the coffin was their "general." "The Golden-Headed King" was lost and his head shot in the battle of Qicheng.
I really didn't find any detailed information about this "Golden Headed King". There were many "Golden Headed Kings" in history, such as Youzhou Li Kuangwei in the late Tang Dynasty. Generally speaking, those who can win this nickname are ruthless people.
On February 4, Li Shouzhen and others arrived in Majiakou.
At that time, the Liao Army's 10,000 infantrymen were responsible for repairing camps and building fortifications, while the cavalry was responsible for patrolling and protecting them. Tens of thousands of main troops were stationed on the west bank of the Yellow River (the Yellow River turns slightly north here, and the west bank of the river is the "Hebei" area, and the east bank is the "Hebei" area. The other side of the river is Shandong Province). There are thousands of large and small ships on the river, and they are busy transporting the main troops to the east bank.
Although Li Shouzhen only had 10,000 men, he decisively ordered the attack and "attacked the thieves halfway across the river."
The Khitan scout cavalry in charge of patrol turned around and ran away. The Jin army followed closely and reached the construction site on the east bank of Majiakou in one breath.
Yelumaxu had just crossed the river, and it only took two days to build it. The defenses were not completed at all and did not have any combat effectiveness. Moreover, neither Yelu Mazai nor the rebel general Zhou Ru expected that the Later Jin Dynasty would use its troops so quickly that they were caught off guard. The soldiers fled for their lives and their morale collapsed.
The Khitan soldiers rushed to cross the river. Thousands of them fell into the water and were drowned. Thousands more were shot to death.
The Liao army on the west bank of the Yellow River was unable to cross the river for support. They could only watch the friendly troops being slaughtered. They wailed and cried bitterly and were forced to break camp and retreat. From then on, they never dared to detour eastward and gave up the "Operation Left Hook" to salute.
In this battle, Li Shouzhen captured 800 Khitan war horses, captured 78 generals alive, and captured 500 soldiers alive. Shi Chonggui ordered them all to be killed.
The Majiakou blockade successfully cut off Yang Guangyuan's hopes. The Khitans gave up the "left hook", which was equivalent to giving up on Yang Guangyuan.
On February 8, the Later Jin Dynasty received another good news: Li Yiyin, the governor of Xiazhou Dingnan Army, reported that he had led an army of 40,000 to cross the Yellow River from Linzhou (today's Shenmu County, Shaanxi Province) to attack Khitan.
Why did Li Yiyin of Xiazhou send troops? The story starts five months ago.
In September of the eighth year of Tianfu (943), one of Li Yiyin's cousins, Li Yimin, the governor of Suizhou, plotted to rebel and seize power. He secretly colluded with Tuoba Chongbin, a mid-level military officer in Xiazhou (Yanei commander), and planned to cooperate internally and externally to manipulate Li Yiyin in one fell swoop. . Unexpectedly, the incident was revealed, and Li Yimin gave up Suizhou and fled to Yanzhou with his younger brother Li Yijun and five others.
