The next time was for group discussions to review the "Draft on Institutional Reform", "Draft on Discipline of the Senate" and "Law on Relations with Naturalized Citizens and Naturalized Citizens". Members of the Law Society and some elders of the professions who participated in the drafting of the document traveled among the groups to explain relevant provisions and record unanswerable questions.
It can be said that these three bills are closely related to the vital interests of the elders, and the discussions are relatively lively. During the discussion, someone suggested that the Ministry of People's Security controls three powerful departments. The leader is equivalent to controlling all the internal security forces. Will this pose a threat to the Senate?
"This kind of worry is completely unnecessary." Ma Jia explained, "If we look at the scope of jurisdiction, the powers of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, China's Ministry of Public Security and Japan's Public Security Commission, which we are most familiar with, are almost the same - even longer. Larger. But in actual operation, they do not threaten their respective political systems. What's more, the National Army is under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the Ministry of People's Security. It is by no means a single company that has the final say."
As for whether the Armed Forces Province’s inclusion of the army and navy violates the separation of military and government orders, Dongmen Chuiyu’s explanation is that according to the new system, the People’s Commissar of the Armed Forces Province will be a civilian veteran, and his status is equivalent to the Minister of Defense. The Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy under it belong to the military and political system; the Chief of Army Staff and the Chief of Naval Command under the Chief of General Staff belong to the military order system. The military order system belongs directly to the Chairman of the Senate. Any order involving military mobilization and combat command needs to be issued by the Chairman of the Senate, and then signed and transmitted by the People's Commissar of the Armed Forces before it becomes effective.
Regarding the suggestion by some elders that every elder should "play a role" in the army to safeguard the "legitimate rights and interests" of elders, Dongmen Chuiyu's answer is this:
"gExcept for the General Secretary of the Party who also serves as Chairman of the Military Commission, most members of the Central Committee and Politburo do not have military positions. They do not have military ranks and do not need any officers to be personally loyal to them to ensure their political power; the Central Guard Bureau is not their Personal private soldiers. In the same way. Most of the countries in the world that are politically normal, including the former Soviet Union, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, etc., have no politicians who rely on the personal loyalty of military officers or maintain private soldiers to maintain democracy. 's approach. Even the Junker nobles who have always controlled the army. The army is loyal to a collective, not to him personally. Whether he is a marshal or a second lieutenant, he will be just a reservist when he retires and returns home. As long as we always insist on the Senate commanding the gun, Instead of someone directing the gun, there will not and cannot be a so-called 'dictatorship'...
"Feudal dependence must not and should not be practiced in the Senate. No matter it is called retainers, retainers, retainers or some other patronage system of the British Empire, it is essentially the remnants of feudal personal dependence. Such things will one day occur. Something is wrong! What has been swept into the dustbin of history cannot be picked up and put on your head just because it is replaced with a beautiful shell so-called 'protecting the power of the elders'."
In his heart, Dongmen Chuiyu was very disgusted with the arguments of "dividing the army" and "officers must be loyal to individual senators". Not only himself, but also the vast majority of veteran officers in the Fubo Army strongly opposed this. Regardless of whether they are from pla or military backgrounds, they all agree with the concept of the national army. In their view, once the personal loyalty of officers is established in the army, it is tantamount to forming a servant-two-master situation in the army, which greatly undermines the authority of the Fubo Army's command system.
What worries them even more is that most of the self-proclaimed elders who are paranoid about being persecuted are not capable of controlling the army on their own, and will inevitably use so-called power tactics to win over naturalized civilian officers. The so-called power strategy is nothing more than equal emphasis on kindness and power.
Power. That is impossible to say. Most of the senators were neither the founders nor the commanders of the army, nor did they ever work with the army. It is very difficult for a stranger, a naturalized civilian officer, to have a heartfelt awe for him personally - then it is indispensable to use a large number of "rewards" to "show favor" in order to gain their "loyalty". To solidify this "loyalty". Most likely there will also be competition among the elders.
This will first destroy the army's military order system. In order to win people's hearts, the elders will inevitably interfere with the army's rank promotion, job transfer, salary and benefits, etc. of their officers; naturalized civilian officers will soon take advantage of the elders' expectations. Relying on the power of the elder "master" to resist the orders of superiors and violate the system to seek their own greater interests. Over time, the most important absolute obedience and cohesion between superiors and subordinates in the army will be completely destroyed. Wait until the day comes when the patronage of the elders can no longer satisfy their appetite. The lessons of the Roman Empire and the Turkish Guards were not far away.
"When these 'loyal' officers lead their troops to the gate of the Senate and demand more 'grace', otherwise they will support a certain senator as emperor. The senators will know how conducive to democracy this system is." Dong Dong Menchuiyu complained in private.
But he couldn't say these things: many elders still have "rose-colored fantasies" about their "leadership skills" and have a strong admiration for Long Aotian's "acquisition of subordinates" model. They feel that as long as they are naturalized The people are loyal to him personally, that is to say, he is an NPC with 99% loyalty wherever he fights. Even if the loyalty sometimes drops, giving more rewards can quickly increase the loyalty... Those who break this illusion will be hated by others. .
"Finally, most of the elders are understanding..." Dongmen Chuiyu thought, "Otherwise, the world would really be in chaos."
"Old Ma, since we have veteran discipline, the work of the Discipline Inspection Commission must be managed by our Cheka. Our department has been fighting on the front line of anti-corruption. We have a lot of experience and professionalism..." Yifan grabbed his waistcoat. , just need to speak in a pleading tone.
"You really want to be hated by others." Ma Jia said with a smile.
"For the great cause of the Senate, I don't care about my personal honor or disgrace." Yifan said with awe-inspiring righteousness.
"The functions of the Cheka have not been fully determined yet," Ma Jia said, "but you can rest assured that the anti-corruption of naturalized civilian cadres will definitely be handled by your department. As for whether it can control the Discipline Inspection Commission, I'm afraid we still have to discuss it... "
"Don't worry, if you want to benefit the life and death of the country, how can you avoid misfortunes and blessings! I will do my best until I die." Yifan patted his chest to express his determination. He was thinking about whether to reveal the clues of several major murder cases. , and finally decided that it would be better not to say anything for the time being - when the authority falls to me, it will be too late to say anything.
Some people also have objections to certain provisions in the disciplinary regulations, such as issues of business and contributions. If you are doing business, you can understand that this is an opening for the family members of the elders. However, the donation clause does not stipulate whether the family members of the elders can accept the donation. Some people have suggested that there should be a clear prohibition:
"Contribution itself is a backward and even harmful phenomenon. It should be completely prohibited at the legal level."
"It is very easy to ban all donations from a legal perspective," Yu Eshui said, "or add it in. But one clause cannot solve all the problems, because most donations are carried out through normal buying and selling procedures, and it can be done It has to be legal. To prevent corruption, it’s best to ban family members of elders from doing business.”
"It would be too difficult to prohibit family members of senators from doing business." Ma Jia expressed doubts, "First, the senators themselves have such needs; second, family members of senators must also have a decent way out, and not everyone may join politics or the military. Not everyone has the ability to be a cadre or technician or scientist."
Jin Zhijiao, who works in the Cheka, expressed her opinion: "I have read some materials written by Director Yu. The main purpose of donating is to avoid taxes. We only need to ensure that the collection is reasonable and not unaffordable; and we treat everyone equally, no matter who owns the enterprise." Or land, you have to pay taxes according to regulations, and it becomes unprofitable and risky to donate, so naturally no one will do it.”
"No, it's not that simple. In addition to tax avoidance, the motivation for donation is also the motivation for obtaining asylum. This asylum has two meanings. One is to avoid public and private harassment-this can be done after we complete social transformation. Generally guaranteed; on the other hand, the power and influence of the elders can also be used to strive for more benefits. I am afraid we cannot completely avoid this." Ma Jia said, "This phenomenon of dedication is not a problem even in China in the 21st century. It exists in a modified form, and if we cannot restrict it from the system, just prohibiting it in the form of a disciplinary clause is of little use."
How to restrict it from the system? Ma Jia's view is that the influence of the elders on the executive must be reduced. In his opinion, this is the most obvious advantage of taking shelter from the elders - but it is also the most difficult to achieve, and it can even be said to be impossible. The administrative machinery of the Senate relies almost entirely on the leadership of the senators to function properly. At present, it is clearly written in the disciplinary clauses of elders that elders are not allowed to interfere with administrative procedures by "writing notes" or "saying hello", and it is stipulated that all instructions of elders must be archived in writing. But he has doubts about how effective it will be.
According to the thinking of the Law Society, it is inevitable that elders have great influence in their own departments and units, and it must be tolerated at this stage. The focus is on preventing the "cross-departmental" influence of elders. Especially the influence on naturalized civilian cadres. For this reason, the Law Society put forward an important argument, that is, the Senate must follow the example of the emperor and create the impression among the naturalized people and indigenous people that "all life and death, honor and disgrace are due to God's grace". Specifically, all rewards and punishments for naturalized civilian cadres must be emphasized as coming from the collective "senator" rather than a single senator. Through disciplinary regulations, cross-departmental interference by elders is strictly prohibited. (To be continued...)
